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Slow and Soft Reaction?
People have been perplexed by the slow and soft approach of the Japanese
government in their attempt to bring COVID-19 under control. The first case of
COVID-19 in Japan was confirmed on 16 January 2020. On 30 January, the
Japanese government set up the COVID-19 Countermeasures Headquarters
(which is a different body from the Government Countermeasures Headquarters,
based on the New Influenza Special Measures Act 2012). It published emergency
countermeasures against COVID-19 on 13 February and presented Basic Policies
for Coronavirus Disease Control on 25 February. However, none of these measures
have introduced drastic measures such as border controls and/or curfews.
In the meantime, a quarantine of an international cruise ship began on 4 February
at Yokohama Port (712 people (appeared as “Other” in the WHO Situation Report)
were confirmed positive). The number of confirmed cases has steadily increased,
but not dramatically as in other countries in Europe and North America. When
Northern Italian cities started a lockdown on 21 February, there were only 93 cases
in Japan. When several states in the U.S. introduced severe restrictions in mid-
March, there were about 800 cases in Japan. The Japanese government repeatedly
explained that it was not necessary for Japan to take drastic measures, like a
lockdown, until the decision of postponement of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic
Games was announced on 24 March. The very next day, the Tokyo Governor
strongly asked residents to avoid non-essential outings in order to avoid a surge
in infections. She even put pressure on the central government by suggesting the
possibility of a lockdown of Tokyo. However, the central government did not declare
a state of emergency until 7 April, when the number of confirmed cases reached
3,906. Furthermore, the initial declaration only applied to the seven most affected
prefectures including Tokyo. It was finally widened to cover the whole nation on
16 April when the number reached 8,582. However, the declaration is based on
the New Influenza Special Measures Act 2012 (NISMA, Act No.31 of May 2012)
and does not introduce severe restrictions. Meanwhile there have been calls for a
constitutional amendment to include emergency power.
Emergency Powers in Japan: Past and Present
The previous constitution, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1989-1945),
contained several clauses to take emergency measures such as imperial ordinances
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(Art. 8); the power to proclaim the law of siege (Art. 14); powers appertaining to
the Emperor in times of war or in cases of a national emergency (Art. 31); and
financial measures by means of an imperial ordinance (Art. 70). One of the notorious
examples was use of the imperial ordinance to amend the Peace Preservation Act
1925 by adding death penalty in order to supress political dissent.
In contrast, the present constitution, the Constitution of Japan, has no clause on
emergencies. In the 1950s-1960s there was a constitutional dispute on how to
interpret the absence of an emergency clause in the constitution. Some argued
that the emergency power exists as unwritten law while others claimed that it was a
deficiency of law. Due to the previous experience with its (mis)use, some scholars
commend the absence of emergency power provisions as a farewell to the past
history of wide emergency power. There has been another debate on whether it is
necessary to amend the constitution in order to include an emergency clause. Some
views in favour of the amendment argue that it is necessary to have a written clause
which can prevent abuse of power in emergency. Others oppose the amendment
by claiming that the ordinary law is sufficient to cope with a state of emergency
and a written general clause of emergency power can create an opportunity of
abusing power. After all, the present constitution has not been amended since its
promulgation.
In fact, the absence of an emergency clause in the constitution does not mean that
the government cannot cope with an emergency. There are several specific laws to
deal with a state of emergency: Art. 71 of the Police Act 1954 (Act No. 162 of 8 June
1954); Art. 105 and Art. 106 of the Basic Act on Disaster Management 1961 (Act No.
223 of 15 November 1961) and Art. 76 and Art. 78 of the Self-Defense Forces Act
1954 (Act No. 165 of 9 June 1954). Furthermore, some laws confer a power to the
Cabinet to enact a Cabinet Order to take necessary measures when the Diet is in
adjournment or the House of Representatives is in dissolution, and there is no time
either to convoke an extraordinary session in the Diet or to convoke an emergency
session of the House of Councilors to take action.
The latest example of a state of emergency provided by a specific law is the
one in the NISMA which was enacted after several outbreaks of new flus such
as Pandemic H1N1 in 2009 to prevent the outbreak and spread of the new
influenza and strengthen measures to minimize the impact on people’s lives and
the national economy. The NISMA allows the Prime Minister as the head of the
Government Countermeasures Headquarters for the new influenza to declare a
state of emergency by defining its period, area and overview (Art. 32). The period
cannot exceed two years and its extension is possible for one year as maximum.
The purpose of the NISMA is to strengthen the Act on the Prevention of Infectious
Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases 1998 (Act No. 114
of 2 October 1998) by clarifying the power of the central and local governments. Art.
45 of the NISMA enables prefectural governors to request residents not to leave
their home and request a facility manager to restrict usage of facilities (school, social
welfare facility, entertainment facility etc.) or stop an event at facilities. However, the
NISMA does not foresee any penalty in case of non-compliance.
- 2 -
Modest Amendment of the New Influenza Special
Measures Act 2012
According to the government’s position, Japan’s emergency measures do not
include curfews enforced by penalties and/or fines, nor do they include public
transportation shutdowns; they do not constitute a “lockdown”.
The only new legislation to cope with COVID-19 is the amendment of the NISMA
(Act No. 4 of 13 March 2020) to include COVID-19 under the category of “new
influenza etc” which, other than budgetary measures, needs legislative approval. The
bill was submitted to the Diet on 10 March, passed on 13 March 2020, and came into
effect on 14 March. However, it took more than three weeks for the government to
announce the declaration based on the NISMA despite the fact that it had set up the
Government Countermeasures Headquarters based on the NISMA on 26 March. In
the Prime Minister’s speech upon the declaration of a state of emergency, he asked
people to refrain from going out in order to achieve a 70 to 80 percent decrease of
opportunities for person to person contact, and to follow social distancing policy of
avoiding the “3-Cs” (closed spaces, crowded places and close contact with people)
for a period of one month.
The prefectural governors can now clarify which facility should be closed under
the declaration and request to close. After the declaration of a state of emergency
the Tokyo governor consulted with the central government and announced a list
of facilities to be closed, and requested for them to do so. However, the request is
still without legal penalty. There exists ambiguity and resistance. Some pachinko
parlours (pachinko is a Japanese gambling machine) stay open despite the request
for their closure. The only action that governors can take is to give instruction for
measures and publicize the name of the parlours if they do not follow the instruction.
In fact some parlours which ignored the request and whose names were publicized
by the Osaka governor received more customers than usual as other parlours were
closed. Supermarkets which are allowed to open in order to supply daily goods
and food have become the popular place for families and couples as there are
no other places to go together. Beaches and mountains became crowded with
people. Furthermore, the fundamental problem is that many office workers cannot
work at home because of technical deficiency and work culture although there has
been some progress. Therefore, the goal to decrease direct personal contact by
80 percent, which is strongly recommended by the expert group in order to avoid
an explosive increase in infections which would burden the medical care beyond
capacity, has not been achieved.
In contrast to the unsuccessful situation of social distancing, the only successful
closure has been those of  schools based on Art. 20 of the School Health Safety
Act 1958 (Act No. 56 of 10 April 1958). On 28 February, temporary closure of all
elementary schools, junior high schools, and high schools was suddenly announced
and they were all closed on 2 March. This created chaos for working parents. Only
38% of schools re-opened for the new academic year which started in April and
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more than 80% of universities closed the campus and some of them started online
teaching from April.
Surfacing Argument for Constitutional Amendment
to Include Emergency Power
Some politicians make use of the present situation as a reason to have a
constitutional amendment to include emergency power in the Constitution. In 2012,
the present ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), announced a draft
of a new constitution which included a clause for emergency power. In 2018, the
LDP chose four items as essential constitutional amendments including emergency
power. Its draft provides as follows:
“When there is a special circumstance in which there is no time to wait for the
legislation to be enacted by the Diet because of a large-scale earthquake or other
unusual large-scale disaster, the Cabinet may enact a Cabinet Order in order to
protect lives, bodies and property of the people. The Cabinet, when enacting the
Cabinet Order set forth in the preceding paragraph, shall promptly request the
approval of the Diet as provide for by law.”
Therefore, it is not surprising that during a meeting of the House of Representatives
Steering Committee on 7 April, the Prime Minister emphasized the importance
of discussion on a constitutional amendment. He suggested to have a bipartisan
discussion at the Commission on the Constitution by responding to a statement of a
member of the House of Representatives who emphasized that emergency powers
in the constitution were necessary in order to ensure that the state has some degree
of force in regulating the lives of the people in the event of an emergency.  Prime
Minister Abe himself emphasized the need for amending the Constitution on 3 May,
Constitution Day.
However, what is seriously and urgently needed at the present situation are effective
measures against COVID-19, particularly in response to various real problems
such as shortage of PPE and hospital beds, and a surging risk of unemployment
and economic recession. Accordingly, a public poll in April conducted by NHK (a
public broadcasting company) discovered that the number of people who think
constitutional revision should be a priority has decreased, and 78% of respondents
said other issues should come first.The question is whether those problems cannot
be dealt with under the existing law. If not, what kind of law is necessary? What the
government has done by legislation is just to add COVID-19 to the list of infectious
diseases in the NISMA. Therefore, the government should first propose a new law
if the present legislation is not sufficient to cope with COVID-19 rather than start a
constitutional debate. Then, the constitutionality of such bills needs to be examined.
If such bills are unconstitutional but still necessary because of an exceptional
circumstance, it is time to consider a constitutional amendment. Some might argue
that in an emergency, there is no time to discuss such questions in the legislature.
As far as COVID-19 is concerned, the Japanese government had ample time to
consider a new law or an amendment. Moreover, causes of a state of emergency
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vary. Necessary measures must be different according to each specific situation:
war, natural disaster or pandemic.
Conclusion: Constitutional Test for the Government
As of 11 May, there have been 15,798 confirmed cases and 621 deaths (218,204
tests conducted). The increase is now slowing down but it is not certain that the
peak has been reached because the number of PCR test is very low (1.5 tests per
1,000 people). The threat of a second wave of infection will persist. The government
extended a state of emergency (the previous expiry date was 6 May 2020) on 4
May and asked to maintain a “new lifestyle”. Whether the current “voluntary” social
distancing policy (jishuku) is working is an interesting question to be asked. In
other words, if the consequence achieved by legal restrictions with penalties can
be achieved by “voluntary” social distancing, a harsh regime of emergency is not
necessary. Moreover, whether a government can enact a law which is in proportion
to necessity and does not give unnecessary unfettered power to the government
is a good constitutional test for every government in this difficult time. The current
pandemic threat is not only a challenge for people’s lives but also a challenge
for democracy, rule of law and human rights which provide a system to protect
individuals. In this context sharing good practices of every government beyond
borders is essential when we have only limited knowledge and experience about
COVID-19. Moreover, it is also important to have an independent oversight and
scrutiny mechanism at domestic and international levels in order to evaluate the
measures taken by the governments for the future challenge.
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